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POLICY CHALLENGE
The challenge of creating a single electricity market is twofold: available
transmission capacity must be increased and the operation of existing net-
works and power plants must be improved. Only EU-level electricity network
design can deliver the required net-
work infrastructure. The European
Commission should therefore continue
to push for binding European network
planning, based on both technical and
cost-benefit analyses, while member
states need to move away from the
artificial setting of single national
prices. Electricity prices must be able
to take into account the physical con-
straints of meshed international net-
works, resulting in market-led optimi-
sation of the operation of the system
and ultimately reducing prices.
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Decreasing transmission capacity
jeopardises the single market 
SUMMARYThe European Union has taken steps towards the completion of
the single electricity market, and thus to reduce costs and boost
competitiveness. But there is still much to do. The growing share of inter-
mittent wind power and the relocation of load and generation centres has
put aging networks under severe pressure. In addition, electricity systems
operate at national level while the physical network is international.
Consequently, at certain borders, almost half of the electricity flows from
high to low price areas, and urgently needed transmission lines are not built
because costs and benefits are asymmetrically distributed across borders.
Current cautious plans for more international network planning and better
coordination of national markets will not tap the full efficiency potential.
Source: ENTSO-E. Figure shows change in net transfer capacities
between winter 2004/05 and winter 2009/10 in direction of arrow.b
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1. Partial evidence sug-
gests that the efficien-
cy gains could be huge:
deep integration of the
four German electricity
market zones alone
would reduce the
annual cost of
electricity by an esti-
mated €205 million
(Bundesnetzagentur,
2009, p.69) to €400
million (BMU, 2009).
2. In this sentence,
‘economic’ should be
understood as a very
comprehensive concept
encompassing the min-
imising of short and
long-term costs subject
to given technical and
legal limitations (net-
work capacity, emis-
sion caps, reliability
provisions, etc).
THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE
OF ELECTRICITY to modern
economies is shown by the fact
that final sales of the power sector
represent approximately three per-
cent of European Union GDP. The
price of electricity is not only rele-
vant for direct consumer purchas-
ing power and welfare. Power is a
production factor that is difficult to
replace and the cost of which thus
determines the competitiveness
of many production processes.
And – in contrast to other forms of
energy – electricity is mainly gen-
erated domestically. Thus, effi-
ciency gains in the electricity
sector could boost Europe’s
competitiveness.
There is nothing new in attempting
to reap the benefits of completing
the single electricity market
(SEM). The European Commission
has been striving to do this since
the beginning of the 1990s. Most
recently, the Commission's
EU2020 strategy
paper (European
Commission, 2010)
explicitly refers to the
need ‘to complete the
internal energy mar-
ket’ as a central plank
in putting the EU on a
‘green growth’ track. The
Commission asserts that further
integration of European electricity
markets can boost GDP by 0.5-0.6
percent (European Commission,
2007). The somewhat simplistic
analysis, based on an assumed
average electricity-price reduction
of 20 percent, seems over opti-
mistic. That said, and although it is
difficult to quantify, further
market integration does promise
significant efficiency gains
1. As
well as boosting competitiveness,
a SEM would improve supply secu-
rity and facilitate the integration of
renewables into the EU energy mix.
Pivotal decisions in this policy
area will be made this year. Apart
from the changing of the political
guard at the Commission, the
mandate and powers of newly es-
tablished institutions (the
European Network of Transmission
System Operators for Electricity
and the Agency for Cooperation of
Energy Regulators) will be defined,
and decisions will be taken on mid-
term infrastructure plans, which
might result in the locking-in of
long-term investment paths.
In this policy brief we will analyse
to what extent the SEM has been
completed in terms of market
design and physical
infrastructure. Furthermore, we
ask if the envisaged
reforms will tackle
the two major chal-
lenges that lie ahead
in the electricity
sector, namely in-
creasing the available
transmission capaci-
ty and improving the use of exist-
ing networks and power plants.
The next section considers why
the SEM is important and the
policy steps towards it that have
been taken so far. The subsequent
section presents empirical evi-
dence on the progress towards the
SEM in terms of price convergence,
transmission-capacity utilisation
and extension of cross-border net-
works. Section 3 sets out the chal-
lenges and presents the changes
planned to the organisation of the
international electricity trade and
the planning and financing of net-
work connections. The final sec-
tion presents our recommenda-
tions on the planning and opera-
tion of the electricity network.
1 THE SEM VISION AND
PROGRESS TO DATE
In broad terms, a fully functioning
SEM would be a level playing field
where, at any given time,
electricity demand is met by the
most economic
2 power plants irre-
spective of the member state in
which they are located. Taking a
long-term perspective, the SEM im-
plies that investments in networks
and generation assets should be
designed to decrease the overall
cost of the system. Compared to a
system of national electricity mar-
kets (with occasional cross-border
trade of some surplus electricity)
an integrated EU electricity market
would have obvious advantages.
First, the cost of operation of the
power-plant fleet would be re-
duced, because expensive produc-
tion in one country – which might
be optimal in a purely national set-
ting – would be replaced by cheap-
er generation in another country.
Second, the exercise of market
power by national incumbents
would become more difficult as
the market grows and foreign
competitors punish the withhold-
ing of capacity by acquiring
market shares. Third, the need for
transmission and generation
‘Efficiency gains in
the electricity sector
could boost
Europe’s
competitiveness. ’POWER TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE
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3. See Pollitt (2009),
Buglione et al (2009)
and Bunn and
Zachmann (2009).
4. One obvious draw-
back is that cheap
power plants are com-
pensated for agreeing
to reduce their output.
This creates opportuni-
ties for gaming and
pricing mechanisms
often overcompensate
cheap power plants,
perversely increasing
the incentive to locate
to remote areas.
assets would decline in an inte-
grated market because a larger
market would render some reserve
capacity redundant. Finally, it
might be cheaper to integrate re-
newable energy, because national
supply variability is somewhat
offset in an international system.
However, electricity has some
unique characteristics that make
designing functioning markets
challenging. Electricity delivery re-
quires the existence of networks;
though electricity is a commodity,
it is produced by very different
technologies; it is not possible to
store it cost-effectively; and con-
sumers are less willing, in compar-
ison to other commodities, to
reduce their consumption in peri-
ods of high prices. Consequently,
EU countries have been reluctant
to move away from the traditional
model of vertically integrated
national monopolies and towards
EU-wide market liberalisation.
By and large it has been pressure
applied by the EU’s single market
policy which has moved liberalisa-
tion of national electricity markets
forward. The EU’s efforts to develop
a SEM have taken the form of three
legislative packages (1998, 2003
and 2009). Many analysts consid-
er that the first two packages
made only limited progress.
According to a European
Commission sector inquiry,
opened in 2005 (European
Commission, 2007a), and aca-
demic analyses
3, an inadequate
electricity grid, defective rules for
allocation of the right to use cross-
border electricity lines, differing
national support schemes for
renewables and possibly the
strategic behaviour of market par-
ticipants have prevented the de-
velopment of a fully functioning
single electricity market.
2 HOW INTEGRATED ARE
EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY
MARKETS?
In the member states’ electricity
markets, domestic incumbents
compete to sell electricity with for-
eign incumbents and some inde-
pendent power producers. Apart
from longer-term contracts,
electricity is traded on the day-
ahead market. This market, with
its hourly prices, serves as a refer-
ence for scheduling power plants.
In the day-ahead market (typically
a power exchange) a seller/buyer
bids for how much electricity he
wishes to deliver/order at a certain
price. The market clears at the in-
tersection of the supply and
demand curve. Markets in different
countries produce different prices.
Thus, taking electricity from a low-
price country to a high-price coun-
try is profitable. If transmission
lines were unlimited, arbitrage
should lead to a single European
market with a single European
price. However, transmission lines
within and between countries are
not unlimited. Consequently, on
most borders, the valuable right to
use cross-border transmission
lines is auctioned off. Thus,
electricity prices between
countries differ. It may be noted
that, despite the fact that, within
countries, transporting electricity
over long distances incurs losses,
and network capacity may be con-
strained, most EU member states
(Italy being one exception) apply a
single domestic electricity price.
In terms of operation, investment
incentives and the international
trade in electricity, this system of
linking countries that have single
national prices has obvious flaws.
As each power plant in a country
obtains the same price whether it
is located close to a major industri-
al consumer or in a remote area,
system operators have the costly
duty of rebalancing the system in
case of internal congestion. The
cheap power plant in the remote
area might be asked to reduce pro-
duction while the more expensive
plant in the industrial area might
increase its supply. Although, in
theory, this approach might come
close to optimal, in practice the
process is often inferior to a
market solution that allows for re-
gional price differences
4.
Another flaw in current arrange-
ments is the existence of skewed
investment incentives for con-
sumers and producers. These lead
to underinvestment by consumers
close to cheap plants and underin-
vestment by generators close to
high-demand centres. Finally, ef-
fective international linking of
such systems is very difficult. 
Electrons passing through interna-
tional electricity networks follow
the complicated physics of
meshed alternating-current grids
and do not respect price-zone bor-
ders. Correspondingly, scheduling
power plants on the basis ofcost in both systems. In reality,
however, electricity often flows
against the price differential.In the
German-Dutch case, electricity
flowed from the high price area to
the low price area for 49 percent of
total hours  in 2009 (Figure 1). At
the German-French border this oc-
curred for 46 percent of total
hours. This illustrates the flaws of
a system based on coupling large
national zones that face internal
congestion.
Third, physical interconnections
have not developed substantially
in recent years. Figure 2 shows
the net transfer capacities from
and to Germany between 2005
and 2009. While the import capac-
ity remained constant, the export
capacity decreased by more than
15 percent. The absence of
progress in Germany’s cross-
border transmission capacity is
representative of the EU-wide pic-
ture. Between 2005 and 2009, the
average net transfer import capac-
ity of all countries in the European
transmission system decreased
by more than 15 percent. This is
mainly due to the need for
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 04
5. In 2009 the
Commission opened an-
titrust proceedings
against Swedish
electricity transmission
system operator
Svenska Kraftnät (SvK)
for having limited inter-
connector capacity for
electricity exports. SvK
contended that export
curtailments were nec-
essary to alleviate inter-
nal congestion.
6. One country’s
electricity flows might
loop through other
countries, eg electricity
produced in north
German wind plants goes
via Poland to southern
Germany, though
Poland’s electricity price
is lower than Germany’s.
7. For example the
national implementation
of the 2003 directive;
the installation of a
national regulatory au-
thority in Germany in
2005; market coupling
between France,
Belgium and the
Netherlands in 2006;
and the 2008 merger of
French and German
power exchanges.
8. The German market is
central to European
market integration be-
cause it is directly con-
nected to 10 foreign
electricity zones.
9. We note that
increased correlation or
cointegration are not a
sign of electricity
market integration
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national prices without taking into
account the real physical net-
works within and between
countries makes it necessary for
the system operator to take non-
market measures to ensure
system stability
5. This is illustrated
by two obvious inefficiencies.
First, cross-border transmission
lines are rarely fully utilised de-
spite persisting price differentials.
Second, electricity very often
flows from high- to low-price
areas
6. Overall, the current system
is light years away from the theo-
retically optimal use of European
power plants and transmission
lines that would characterise a
fully functioning SEM.
Despite institutional progress be-
tween 2005 and 2009
7, we argue,
using the case of the  systemically
important German market
8, that
progress has been limited in the
last five years. We base our claim
on three observations: 
First, prices in the countries that
border Germany have not con-
verged significantly with German
prices,and high hourly price differ-
entials were common between
2005 and 2009. In the electricity
market as currently structured,
decreasing differences between
national hourly electricity prices
could be a sign of greater market
efficiency and/or increasing com-
mercially available transmission
capacity. However, Nitsche et al
(2009) found that German
electricity spot prices in 60-90
percent of instances differed by
more than five percent from the
price in almost all neighbouring
countries. In addition, the absolute
annual average price differences
in 2009 for almost all of these
market combinations exceeded
their corresponding 2004 value
9.
Thus, recent reforms have failed to
produce a consistent reduction in
price differentials that would point
to increasing market integration.
Second, price differentials are
almost unrelated to capacity usage.
In an integrated market, as long as
lines are not fully used, the price
differential should be zero while, as
soon as congestion occurs (at full
capacity), the price differential de-
pends on the difference in marginal
Price differentials (in €) and flows at the German-French border
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Figure 1: Hourly price differentials and corresponding electricity flows in 2009
Source: Bruegel based on data from EEX, Powernext, APX and ENTSO-E. MWh = megawatt hours.increased security margins for
cross-border trade because of
growing shares of intermittent re-
newable production. Thus, de-
creasing availability of cross-
border transmission for commer-
cial operations becomes an in-
creasingly limiting factor for
market integration. 
In conclusion, the remaining inter-
national price differentials, the in-
sufficient response of electricity
flows to price signals and non-in-
creasing cross-border transmis-
sion capacity demonstrate that in
the last five years progress to-
wards a single market for
electricity has been limited.
3 CHALLENGES AND PLANNED
CHANGES
The SEM faces two challenges: in-
creasing the available transmis-
sion capacity and improving the
use of existing networks and
power plants.
Increasing investment in intercon-
nection is needed because the
commercially available transmis-
sion capacity will otherwise de-
crease for three reasons. First, the
increasing share of intermittent
wind power will require even
higher safety margins. As these
must be taken into account in the
calculation of commercially avail-
able transmission capacity, the
latter will shrink. Second, national
and cross-border infrastructure is
ageing and thus becoming less re-
liable. Third, the massive shift in
generation mix (the scaling-up of
renewables) leads to a new geo-
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graphic distribution of generation
in central-western Europe. This de-
velopment will challenge the trans-
mission systems, which saw  their
last significant construction boom
in the 1960s and 1970s (as
shown by Figure 3), when they
carried electricity from the large
thermal and nuclear power plants
built at that time. As a conse-
quence of the longer distances be-
tween renewable generation sites
and load centres, national and re-
gional imbalances will increase.
Through the peculiarities of
electricity flows this could lead to
an increase in the general level of
congestion in Europe. Thus, to
avoid a deterioration of the current
congestion situation, significant
investment in European transmis-
sion networks is needed. 
The extension of electricity grids
is, however, still jointly decided by
national transmission system op-
erators and regulators based on
mainly technical (ie not econom-
ic) criteria. In this process the pos-
itive and negative effects of
national network investment on
other countries’ electricity sys-
tems are insufficiently taken into
account. Electricity lines that
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Figure 2: Net transfer capacities from/to Germany in megawatts,
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Source: International Energy Agency (2005).
Figure 3: Annual average increase in length of 220-400kV 
transmission lines in 16 European countrieswould increase cross-border trans-
fer capacity and thereby global
welfare are not being built because
the national regulators do not take
into account welfare gains in other
zones
10. Thus, those investments
are typically not optimal with re-
spect to the SEM.
To resolve this issue the EU has
come up with different, not fully
coherent, solutions: 
1 Definition of priority projects
linked to possible access to EU
funds: in 2010 the old Trans-
European Network guidelines
will be replaced by an ‘EU
Energy Security and
Infrastructure Instrument’. This
instrument is intended to be
based less on projects pro-
posed by individual member
states (and their national inter-
ests) but is to be developed
from a European perspective on
security of supply and efficien-
cy. As EU funding is limited and
discretionary, decisions are
subject to intra-EU distribution
considerations. This instrument
might fix some bottlenecks but
is not an integral network devel-
opment solution.
2 Presentation of a coordinated
network development plan: in
2010 the European Network of
Transmission System Operators
for Electricity in cooperation
with the Agency for Cooperation
of Energy Regulators and the
European Commission will pre-
pare a Ten-Year Network
Development Plan. This non-
binding plan will combine the
bottom-up approach underpin-
ning national or regional invest-
ment plans with top-down
policy goals (primarily the EU’s
so-called ‘20-20-20’ green
target). However, the absence
of formal obligations on grid
users to provide the informa-
tion necessary to calculate
prospective load-
patterns, and the
lack of a European
network model
within the
European Network
of Transmission
System Operators
for Electricity and the Agency
for Cooperation of Energy
Regulators, will make it difficult
to obtain an accurate picture of
the investment needs.
Furthermore, the means of im-
plementation of this non-bind-
ing plan are rather weak.
Consequently, it is unlikely that
the first Ten-Year Network
Development Plan will deliver
an ambitious blueprint for a
European electricity network. 
3 Exemptions from regulation for
interconnectors: national regu-
latory agencies might, for a lim-
ited period, allow transmission
system operators to retain rev-
enues from auctioning capacity
in new interconnectors be-
tween countries with different
prices. As demonstrated by the
cable between the Netherlands
and Norway, this mechanism
can incentivise some highly
profitable direct links between
countries. However, as these
exemptions only concern direct
cross-border interconnectors,
they will be unable to incen-
tivise the construction of the
domestic transmission lines
that are necessary to remove
cross-border bottlenecks.
In order to increase the available
transmission capacities, it will not
be enough to upgrade
existing, or construct
new, cross-border
transmission lines. It
will also be neces-
sary to use the trans-
mission system
better. For this, the EU
has defined in general terms the
introduction of an improved con-
gestion management method
11.
This approach is derived from the
market coupling initiatives in cen-
tral-western Europe. The idea of
market coupling is that cross-
border transmission capacity is
not auctioned off explicitly but al-
located by the power exchanges
concerned based on price differen-
tials. The trilateral market coupling
between Belgium, France and the
Netherlands has been highly suc-
cessful in reducing the number of
hours in which price differentials
between these countries have per-
sisted (the share of hours with
equal prices increased from 20
percent to around 70 percent) and
flows now always follow prices.
The planned inclusion of Germany
and Luxembourg into a ‘pentalater-
al’ market coupling in 2010 as well
as the envisaged European market
coupling will lead to the desired de-
crease in the number of hours with
low-to-medium price differentials.
But market coupling will not deliver
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10. For instance, a con-
nection between north
and south Germany
that would relieve the
Netherlands and Polish
networks (from inner-
German flows) would
need to be funded by
German electricity
consumers.
11. Elaborated at the
17th Florence
Electricity Regulatory
Forum. Participants in-
clude national regulato-
ry authorities, member
state governments, the
European Commission,
transmission system
operators, electricity
traders, consumers,
network users, and
power exchanges.
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‘Network develop-
ment and power
sector operation
must be optimised
at European level. ’significantly better use of trans-
mission capacity and not allow
efficient coordination of power
plant scheduling internationally.
Both would require a coordinated
optimisation of system operations
instead of coupling nationally opti-
mised single-price zones.
In summary, the proposed
changes are not capable of deliver-
ing fully on increasing the avail-
able transmission capacities and
improving the use of existing net-
works and power plants.
4 RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the outlined chal-
lenges, network development and
power sector operation need to be
optimised at the European level. 
European network development:
as implicitly acknowledged by the
Ten-Year Network Development
Plan, only EU-level electricity net-
work design would be effective in
delivering the required network
infrastructure. The EU should
therefore continue to push for
jointly optimised and properly im-
plemented network development.
This would require defining fair
legal rules for sharing the costs
and benefits of investment in
transmission lines that have ef-
fects on more than one country’s
electricity system. Such a cost-
benefit allocation system might
allow a departure from the require-
ment for agreement by unanimity
for network planning and thus
might allow the European Network
of Transmission System Operators
for Electricity to be given the
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power to produce binding network
planning at EU level that is based
on international cost-benefit con-
siderations. Money spent on inte-
grated network planning and cost-
benefit reallocation could in fact
be much more productive in terms
of achieving the single market
than multi-billion-euro EU funding
to (politically) selected
infrastructure projects.
European power sector operation:
linking nationally optimised sys-
tems does not mean that all poten-
tial efficiency gains from an inte-
grated market will be reaped. If
one accepts coordinated optimisa-
tion, there are three alternatives to
the current system: a jointly opti-
mised European single-price area,
a jointly optimised European
system of sub-national zones, or
jointly optimised European nodal
pricing. In the first case, the draw-
backs of national single-price sys-
tems (difficult market-based oper-
ation and skewed investment in-
centives) will be present. In a
European zonal system, these
flaws will vanish with decreasing
zone size. The workability and effi-
ciency of such a sub-national
zonal system can be seen in
Scandinavia, where Denmark and
Norway are split into different
zones. But splitting the highly
meshed European transmission
system into hundreds of meaning-
ful zones is difficult. Nodal pricing
circumvents this problem by
making each injection/withdrawal
point of a network (node) into a
price zone of its own. This first-best
solution – which provides correct
locational incentives to generators
and consumers, allows almost
fully market-based optimisation of
power plant scheduling and gives
valuable information on transmis-
sion bottlenecks – has been suc-
cessfully applied in Australia, New
Zealand and the US. Various case
studies find that efficiency im-
provements are possible with this
solution (Eto et al, 2006).
European-level implementation of
jointly optimised network develop-
ment and power sector operation
is a delicate issue. On one hand,
bottom-up approaches based on
unilateral (or only regionally coor-
dinated) implementation of nodal
pricing and network planning
might result in persisting incom-
patibilities between regions. The
difficult coexistence of different re-
gional nodal pricing arrangements
in the US provides an illustration of
this issue that might have even
worse effects in the highly meshed
continental European electricity
network (see Germany with its ten
electricity borders). 
On the other hand, the technical
and political complexity of coordi-
nating some twenty national regu-
latory systems and thousands of
stakeholders (regulators, trans-
mission system operators, genera-
tors, consumers, etc.) seems
bound to lead to failure.
A combination of both approaches
is required. The long-term vision of
jointly optimised network develop-
ment and power plant operation
should be laid out in a binding EU
instrument. The technical details
should provide enough freedom forb
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gradual implementation and adap-
tation to different regulatory sys-
tems, while ensuring that the ex-
change of information required to
optimally coordinate power-plant
operation across borders is
standardised. In addition to these
top-down components the trans-
mission system operators should
be given stronger incentives for
deep cooperation. Currently, trans-
mission systems are primarily op-
erated within national bound-
aries
12. This is unnatural, as merg-
ers of transmission system opera-
tors across borders could reap sig-
nificant efficiencies of scale and
scope
13.So far, however, the neces-
sary institutions to regulate and in-
centivise more cooperation be-
tween cross-border transmission
system operators are not in place.
If national regulatory agencies find
ways to incentivise increasing co-
operation of network companies to
jointly optimise their networks
(both in terms of day-to-day opera-
tion and investment) this could
lead to a ‘bottom-up’ approach to
optimal electricity network plan-
ning and operation. Competition
authorities will need to keep pace
with the integration of energy mar-
kets (for example with respect to
market definitions).
We should not wait for the results
of the European market coupling
and the first network development
plan to appear between 2015 and
2020 before bringing forward a
blueprint for a truly European
electricity network.
Research assistance by Juan
Ignacio Aldasoro, Clément Serre
and Hendrik Worschech is grateful-
ly acknowledged.
12. The exceptions are
two recent acquisitions:
the Dutch transmission
system operator TenneT
acquired the German
Transpower and the
Belgian transmission
system operator Elia
bought the German
50Hertz Transmission.
13. Here, a determined
implementation of the
unbundling require-
ments in the third pack-
age might speed up a
meaningful
consolidation of
European transmission
system operators.
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